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NINETEEN EIGHTY-FIVE

By George Morgenstern

It's the first year after, and if nobody is watching on the telescreen*, perhaps it's safe to admit that the late George Orwell had something. Little Brother's war against Eastasia is going strong. It's been going a full year now and (Malik forbid) ought to run at least as long as "South Pacific". South Pacific? Anybody fighting South Pacific? Well, Little Brother can take on South Pacific next.

Oh, that's right. We're getting up an alliance with South Pacific -- Australia, New Zealand, that outfit. One of those mutual defense things. Somebody attacks us, New Zealand saves us. Somebody attacks New Zealand, we save her. Collective security, they call it.

The Ministry of Truth has its headaches. I ought to know. I've been put on the job of getting up a total on the casualties in Little Brother's Eastasia police action. Police action is right. We pulled the box, but the wagon never comes. By the way, we've got a new directive on casualties. The term in Newspeak (official language adopted last year, 1984) is to be "caz". Saves letters and time. Their names don't matter, Little Brother says. It's just a police action.

Little Brother has a hard time. It would have touched your heart to hear him say he'd never given out so many posthumous Medals of Honor at one crack. Never thinks of himself. Just goes ahead and hands out those medals, dozens, maybe hundreds of them, and reads the citation: ". . . above and beyond the call of duty". Above and beyond the call of duty! How about Little Brother? Handing out those medals and reading those citations till his voice cracks. There are heroes on the home front, too, you know, and Little Brother --

To get back to my job at the Ministry of Truth, it's tough handling these caz tolls. The official report had them down at 70,000; General Bradley said they're 141,000; and Little Brother comes along with a different figure still -- 80,000. Well, of course, we took Little Brother's figure. Little Brother's always right.

Whatever the number of caz, it isn't really very much, for, as Little Brother says, look how many people get killed in a year driving

* A device (described in George Orwell's well known fantasy, *1984*) by which the authoritarians kept close watch over their subjects.

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automobiles. As Little Brother says, you think it's tough in Eastasia? Get out with those Sunday drivers.

II

The Ministry of Truth has got a good show running over on the Hill. It's an investigation. We put on lots of investigations as telescreen attractions. I think the Kefauver Krime Kommission had the best box office pull. They dealt a fatal blow to bingo. Boy, did they make Ambassador O'Dwyer sweat! And that Tobey! Can he pray before a camera!

Well, this particular investigation feature is about why Little Brother fired General MacArthur. I think the charge is that he was a thought-criminal -- said Little Brother's way of fighting Eastasia was nuts. They were going to cut his buttons off in the lobby of the Waldorf Towers at first, but a sneak preview of that scene, with Eric Johnston impersonating MacArthur, didn't go over very well when it was tried out at Chevy Chase; so they dropped that from the script.

Of course, we had to let Mac talk, and that's always fatal. He's too good, and Little Brother has the voice coach back for an hour a day again. Got to think of the campaign in '86. Whistle stop, here I come!

After MacArthur, we (I mean our side) did the best we could. We trotted out Marshall, and Bradley, and Collins and Vandenberg. They wore their insignia on their epaulets and the customary rubber stamp with Potomac battle stars on their chests. I think Marshall had two oak leaf clusters. They all made a good try, and, of course, Morse, and McMahon, and Saltonstall and the rest of them on our team helped them plenty.

I learned a lot by listening to Marshall. He's an expert at Newspeak -- better, I think, than any of us over at the Ministry of Truth. I took notes, because I think I can use some of the tips he gave us all on how to express ourselves. I've got a few examples here in my notebook. This one here is pretty good:

"I am getting an increasing confidence toward the possibility of a satisfactory conclusion of the war in Puerto Rico. Whether or not it will be a military triumph or not I don't know how to characterize it."

Well, I don't see how anybody could characterize it better than that, but I think I ought to read you another one from my notes. This will make it all perfectly clear what the military objective is:

"And it is my strong belief that the attractiveness of General MacArthur's program is because it drops into this aching void of one knowing nothing of what the military end is that we are aiming at."

General Marshall also made some very telling points at the expense of General MacArthur, as, for instance, where he says:

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"I have said many times, we feel that the procedures as proposed by General MacArthur of limitations that we should not abandon, I mean of not limitations, of conditions which we consider we should not risk."

I'll bet General Whitney's sitting up late at the Waldorf trying to think of a comeback to that.

III

Our star witness, naturally, was Dean Acheson, whom that despicable exponent of McCarthyism, Senator McCarthy, habitually calls "the Red Dean of Foggy Bottom". Well, fog always settles, but nobody can kid me that Acheson isn't a tall man. He always brings the fog in on a high level. Incidentally, Acheson and McCarthy met in an elevator, and was there a flashing exchange of rapier-like wit!

"I'm Joe McCarthy", said Joe McCarthy.

"I'm Dean Acheson", said Dean Acheson.

Doesn't that kill you? No, I guess it doesn't. Little Brother hasn't sent you to Eastasia.

You know, the subtler minds among us are capable of doublethink, but Acheson is so much smarter than all the rest of us that he delivered his entire testimony -- seven days of it -- in triplethink. He was even able to convince himself that Yalta was a good deal. This shows that he is on a higher astral plane than anybody else. Smart fellow, that. And well played, as we say on the cricket fields of Groton.

Upon returning from the big investigation feature -- I found that the Ministry of Truth had got an interesting new assignment. This was to take all editorials in opposition newspapers and rewrite them in the style of the New York Times editorial page before they are filed in the Library of Congress.

There was a similar assignment applying to all newspapers which directed that news stories pertaining to foreign policy were to be rewritten in the style of James Reston, Clifton Daniel, or Dean Acheson -- I forget which. Owen Lattimore and John Stewart Service are supervising this project. Alger Hiss was to have been put in charge, but when it appeared that, unfortunately, for reasons beyond his control, he would not be available for five years, substitutes had to be found.

Before reading a sparkling Times editorial on the Department of Sanitation to acquaint myself with the style, I cleaned up my "In" basket. There were two items in it requiring revision. One was a quotation in the wallstjrnl from Sir Ernest Benn, who used to be president of the British Society of Individualists before he was given a number by

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Ingsoc (English Socialism to you). This was a particularly dastardly example of thought-crime, to the following effect:

"Politics is the art of looking for trouble, finding it whether it exists or not, diagnosing it wrongly, and applying the wrong remedy."

I rewrote this and sent it off with a directive to Bartlett's Quotations to replate. In its new form it is much better:

"There is no politics in Welfstat, only service, and Comrade Brannan, Comrade Ewing, and Comrade Donaldson give you the best. No Irish need apply to the State Department, which is for English only. If a Soviet agent, please wear a pink carnation for easy identification. Cheerful credit, easy terms, and no questions asked at the RFC."

I think Sir Ernest will be proud to have said that.

IV

The other matter requiring correction and revision was a quotation attributed to our revered former Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, on September 15, 1936. This was dragged up in the Senate on November 27, 1945, by Burton K. Wheeler, that nasty old isolationist. He quoted Comrade Hull:

"At times there has been criticism because we would not depart from our traditional policy and join with other governments in collective arrangements carrying the obligation of employing force, if necessary, in case disputes between other countries brought them into war. That responsibility, carrying direct participation in the political relationships of the whole world outside, we cannot accept, eager as we are to support means for the prevention of war. For current experience indicates how uncertain is the possibility that we, by our action, could vitally influence the policies or activities of other countries from which war might come."

I am sure that Comrade Hull was deliberately misquoted, and am substituting for this canard a quotation from the pamphlet, "Powers of the President to Send Armed Forces Outside the United States", released by the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, February 28, 1951. Of course, I realize that there is a slight anachronism, but the expressions are more suitable. My substitute selections are:

"Use of the congressional power to declare war, for example, has fallen into abeyance. . . . The constitutional power of the Commander in Chief has been exercised more often because the need for armed international action has grown more acute. . . . Repelling aggression in Korea or Europe cannot wait upon congressional debate."

Little Brother is always right! Well, almost always.

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Not Merely Gossip *A Supplement to* Human Events Vol. VIII, No. 26

By Frank C. Hanighen June 27, 1951

THE HORRORS OF PEACE: Among Administration circles, there is growing an uncomfortable feeling that "peace" (or, as the profane Opposition terms it, "appeasement") might be used, can be used and -- darkest thought of all -- is already being used to the disadvantage of the White House. Particularly, when peace does not come tidily packaged and delivered just at the moment for which planners had carefully planned.

For, there is no evidence that the Administration had expected Mr. Malik to make his offer of a "cease-fire" arrangement -- at least before the President got off his "give-em-hell" oration in Tennessee. On the contrary there are visible signs that the Palace Guard, which in their manufactured propaganda had been moaning and sobbing for "peace" for months, were not pleasantly receptive.

The press described the reception as "wary", suggesting great (and sad) wisdom about the ways of the Muscovites. But observers thought the State Department attitude might better be described as "frigid". There are some unkind souls who have long believed that the Administration for months has really only wanted to "talk" about peace, to let the "accordion war" go on for a spell, the while preparations were made for full spending in Europe, Point IV for the rest of the world and tight controls for the sovereign people of the United States. Then, and only then, would the proper sort of "peace" in Korea be unfolded.

(Some observers insist that the Taft-Hoover battle against "troops for Europe" last winter lasted so long that it upset the Administration timetable. As a result of this and other delays, the White House forces are caught without controls assured and appropriations voted.)

One trouble with Administration appeasement has always been that Stalin does not cooperate very well. He doesn't recognize legislative timetables, nor schedules of speeches by Administration leaders. In the present instance, Mr. Malik, with diabolic cleverness chose the moment when the economic controls so ardently desired by the Administration were up for renewal before Congress.

The word from Malik strengthened the Congressional clamors for loosening of the controls. How could it have been otherwise? How could legislators heed warnings of "inflation", when they were besieged with protests about "deflation" from small businessmen, and demands for easy credit from Labor? The retail "depression" (so vividly described in our May 30 article by Harry Serwer) has been in full swing, with merchants worrying about inflated inventories and suffering from pressure from banks, and with workers unable to get terms of $10 down on what they want to buy. Prospects of an early peace, in such a situation, inevitably led to the present imbroglio in Congress over its demand for renewal of the Defense Production Act. These afflictions indeed loom as "the horrors of peace" to the soldiers in the marbled trenches of Government offices in Washington.

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MOSCOW CONTROL: The effects of Malik's bid show this: Stalin's strong influence over what we do, not only abroad, but also at home. Across the seas, Russia gets credit for bringing about "peace". The U.S. appears in the picture as a power that has to go along with Stalin.

Within the United States, Malik produced a chain reaction: (1) the intensification of the fight in Congress to amend the control bill; and (2) sharp descent of

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the soldiers' morale which, as the New York Times (June 26) reported, was "confused" by the peace move. In short, just as a year ago when we ventured into Korea, Stalin retains the initiative. MacArthur proposed a course by which the U.S. would take the initiative. But Truman's course makes Stalin the pace-setter.

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IF APPEASEMENT WINS: If we engage in diplomatic ping pong with Malik over peace in Korea, the upshot will be appeasement, and history will classify the Korean adventure as a U.S. defeat. No amount of Administration propaganda -- now pouring out through the usual Government channels -- can make it otherwise. We were pledged to free all Korea. A compromise settlement (inevitable under the "limited war" strategy) will leave North Korea under Soviet control and South Korea under constant Soviet threat. History will say that the UN also registered another step in its long, unbroken record of failure. For, on October 7, that organization voted by a big majority for crossing the 38th Parallel to free North Korea. Both UN and the Administration, profiting by their propaganda hegemony, will doubtless reap ephemeral popular credit for "peace". But no matter how clever this word manipulation will be, it cannot cover the fact of defeat.

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MACARTHUR: If negotiations over Korea should lead to a real U.S. diplomatic victory (now largely discounted in Washington), if the Soviets are actually swayed by fear of defeat in the Far East (as Administration propaganda suggests), if the position is reversed and the Soviets "appease" us -- then, the credit should go to MacArthur. The General by his courageous stand for his military and political strategy forced a reversal -- at least verbally -- of our appeasement policy.

He made the Administration change its attitude on Formosa, on the Nationalist Government and to pledge that it would try to keep the Chinese Communists out of the UN, not to mention reinforcing the Nationalists on Formosa. Of course, these somersaults of Acheson are largely verbal; he might well turn back on his words, as he has done before. Nevertheless, MacArthur gave to the U.S. a strong bargaining posture in the international diplomatic poker game. Stalin respects such a posture.

Is this the view of prejudiced, pro-MacArthur supporters? Not at all. No less an organ than the New York Times, which never showed any sympathy for the General's views, now gives support to this thesis. Today, Mr. James Reston of the Times reports that among factors considered as influencing Russia to seek a settlement are the following: (a) "The hearings on the MacArthur dismissal had demonstrated that pressure was building up here for extending the war to Manchuria"; (b) "the situation therefore was more of a threat to the Soviet position in the Far East than Moscow liked and the war was encouraging Western rearmament and Western air bases around the Soviet Union."

And the anti-MacArthur Times, on the same date, editorially paid grudging tribute to MacArthur's role in constructively altering our policy, by conceding that the MacArthur hearings helped "harden" the Far East policies of the U.S. and the UN. "In so far as these policies" said the Times, "are a consequence of General MacArthur's advocacy of these, he and his followers may take satisfaction in their contribution to this end result." In short, it is MacArthur, not Truman who should be hailed as the real agent of "peace" -- if there is a real peace.

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EISENHOWER: According to one of our usually reliable grapevines, Mr. George Allen has recently visited General Eisenhower in Paris. It can be safely assumed that Mr. Allen did not want to talk to the General exclusively on military subjects. For this is the Mr. Allen who was often called "the court jester" of President Truman several years ago. Allen moved out of the White House, but still visits

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there when in Washington. And in the past two years, he has emerged as a strong booster of General Eisenhower for President.

Many will associate these two facts -- Allen's connections with Truman, and Allen's promotion of a political future for the General -- with stories that Truman might favor Eisenhower to succed him in '52. But no such conclusion necessarily follows news of a conference between Ike and George. For reports from Paris have suggested for some time that the General, in face of troubles with the Europeans, has been "getting fed up with his job". Also, it is well known that Ike has carefully avoided a visit to Washington during the MacArthur hearings. May we expect some surprising move from one regarded as the decisive "x" in the 1952 equation?

One thing is certain: Eisenhower has not forgotten politics. An amusing illustration of this is mentioned by House members returning from Europe after visiting the General. These members formed a group whose travels on the Continent we described last week. This story is told:

One member of the House group lightly passed the remark that he would not mind being photographed with Ike, that it would be good for his (the Congressman's) political future. A GHQ public relations officer who was listening quickly picked up the suggestion and said that he would consult the General about such an idea; he guessed that maybe the General would consent to a picture with the whole group of Congressmen. The next day the officer returned with the news that the General liked the idea, in fact he would be glad to pose not only with the entire group but also with any individuals who so desired.

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BYRD STRATEGY: The senior Senator from Virginia carried farther his campaign for a realignment of parties, for an alliance of conservatives whether of North or South, in a speech two days ago (June 25) in Atlanta, Ga. Last week, we called attention to his recent remarks in Detroit in which he sketched the possibility of such development. Now Byrd is moving into a less theoretical phase of what many believe to be a real crusade.

In Atlanta, he made a strong distinction between the Democratic Party of the old states-rights tradition, and the "Truman Democratic Party". The latter, he dealt with severely, particularly for its "socialization". He pointedly reminded his listeners of the fact that four southern states, in rebellion against the Truman regime, showed their independence in 1948 by supporting Governor Thurmond. Finally, the Virginia Senator urged that the South "demand" restoration of the two-thirds rule in the 1952 Democratic convention, "before presidential candidates are voted upon". (In Democratic conventions for a century, up to 1936, the rule was that a two-thirds majority of delegates was necessary to nominate a presidential candidate. This rule gave the Southerners a virtual veto on nominees. It was repealed in 1936, in the full tide of Roosevelt domination.)

This demand by Byrd -- according to those who know best his strategy and that of Southerners favoring realignment with the GOP -- effectively reveals his real objective. Byrd knows as well as any Southern Democratic leader that there is no possibility of restoration of the two-thirds rule, that the Northern hegemony in the Democratic Party is permanent and that Truman would not permit restoration. Why, therefore, did the Virginian give this demand so much emphasis?

Here is the strategy of Byrd. His ringing words for "restoration" will be pondered. Southern leaders will, of course, discuss the depressing fact that no "restoration" is possible. They will then be faced with the inescapable conclusion that their only course is one so thoroughly and insistently urged upon them by GOP Senator Karl Mundt in speeches in every southern state during the past few months -- namely, "realignment with the Republicans". In short, Byrd in his Atlanta speech was slyly setting the stage for a soul-searching drama of the South. How will the

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Southerners meet their problem? If they incline to the path outlined by Mundt, then Byrd again will guide the strategy.

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THE UNION FOREVER: Among other things, a Senator swears to uphold the Constitution when he takes office. Nobody, however, takes the trouble to ask: Which Constitution? In view of the changes written into the Constitution of 1789, not only by amendment and judicial interpretation, but more so by procedural invasion of its spirit, one could properly ask the question -- which Constitution? An instance comes to hand right now, in the issuance of a subpoena by a Senate committee ordering the Governor of a "sovereign" state to appear before it in Washington. Governor Fuller Warren of Florida has thus been summarily ordered to appear at a hearing in the Federal Capital on July 9.

Such a thing could hardly have been envisioned by the Founding Fathers; the Constitution would never have been ratified if the people of that day thought it gave any branch of the Federal government the power to order their local officials around. For the Americans in those days were quite jealous of their local autonomy. All of the thirteen states were coequal with one another and coequal with the Federal government. Except in the realms specifically assigned to the central authority, the Governor of a state ruled without interference from the Federal government and protocol held his person to be on a par with that of the President. That was Union -- under the original Constitution.

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THE BATTLE OF RESEARCH: The other evening, at what might be called a cocktail forum, we heard a spirited lady lecture the ranking GOP member of an important committee for his failure to put more pointed questions to Acheson when the latter appeared before the MacArthur Committee. This scene was symptomatic of continuing criticism of the Opposition, for their shortcomings as cross-examiners in the committee room. But it is increasingly being realized that cross-examiners are made as well as born, and that witnesses can withstand sharp questions if they are properly briefed.

Thus, one Capital humorist remarked, "Miss Utley is the only writer I know who enjoys the distinction of having her book read by a Senator". But the joker was not un-constructive, for he meant Senator Brewster, who read that author's current best seller, The China Story, and profited thereby. He not only made an informative speech about the book, but his questions to the Secretary of State proved needle-sharp. Also, we might mention the case of one witness (before the MacArthur Committee) whose testimony against the Administration was generally judged very forceful and which survived successfully the jabbing of pro-Administration questioners. Two newspapermen who were thoroughly versed in the pitfalls of committee hearings put the individual through a veritable rehearsal the night before. He proved a willing scholar -- and next day passed the test.

But, not all Senators are as diligent as Brewster, nor have they the time. Nor are there always voluntary helpers (like the newspapermen mentioned above) who will assist in the preparations for a committee "show". The Administration preparations are not voluntary; in the great white buildings downtown, literally thousands of experts are available for briefing for such matters; these are paid (by the taxpayer) and "know their stuff". The scant staffs on the Hill, members of which have to try to be "expert" on taxes one day and China the next, cannot humanly provide ammunition of the same wide gauge for the Opposition. Yet, without such help, without such briefing, the Opposition will continue to lose in the battles of "wits and words".

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ERRATUM: We apologize, to the person mentioned and to our readers, for a typographical error in Not Merely Gossip of June 20, page 2, item entitled "In Stalin's Footsteps". In the last paragraph, Mr. Charles E. Wilson was erroneously described as a "great opponent" of the free enterprise system. The correct term is "exponent".

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European Supplement *to* Human Events Vol. VIII, No. 26

By Bertrand de Jouvenel Paris — June, 1951

The Elections: The French went eagerly and in large numbers to the polls, dispelling the legend of a tired and cynical indifference of the French electorate. Some 19 millions voted, out of an electorate of some 25 millions. Thus attendance at the polls was equivalent to what it had been at the peak of political excitement, in 1946. This is all the more remarkable in view of the following facts.

Voting was under a new law, which the electors had no time to properly understand and which seemed to them distastefully tricky. The campaign was very short, and very badly conducted by all but the Communists (for whom the campaign, as it were, is always going on). There were very few public meetings; in many cases candidates held no more than one meeting a day in very inadequate halls; in the countryside especially there was little opportunity to hear the candidates. Nor was the electoral literature well distributed. It was prepared too late, sent out in bulk by the local governments which were ill prepared to handle suddenly this big task. There was little use of the radio: television of course is not yet practical.

Notwithstanding all this, the electors proved that they wanted to exercise their rights as citizens. Indeed, during the days before the election, those who for one reason or another were not in possession of their voting cards queued up in the city halls, and displayed great eagerness, and it must be said that the local officials worked day and night to cope with the situation. This eagerness will induce the French press in the future to give more attention to political information for the public. Publishers and editors must now come off their attitude of underestimating interest in public affairs and of pretending that the readers want no heavy stuff, nothing but amusement.

This strong desire to vote was statistically equal to that of 1946, but was of a very different nature. This time there was no excitement but great earnestness. People felt that it mattered. Anyone who spent a day at the polling places must have seen that the people were in great doubt as to the best means of conveying their intention; there was hesitation to the last moment as to the exact ticket to be chosen.

* * *

Landslide for the Right: The figures leave no doubt as to the orientation of the electorate. It is preposterous to assert that the French voted for the Third Force, the official view which has been all too readily accepted by foreign correspondents.

The Third Force was constituted in 1947 when two of the founding parties of the Fourth Republic, i.e. the Socialists and the M.R.P., dropped their previous alliance with the Communists and went on thereafter with the Radicals, and kindred elements grouped around the Radicals, under the generic title of R.G.R. Thus Socialists, M.R.P. and R.G.R. constituted the Third Force. The parties thus grouped together in 1946 obtained about 10,851,000 votes. In 1951 they obtained only 7,312,000 votes. In short, they lost 3,540,000 votes.

This cannot be accounted as anything but a very severe defeat. It means that more than 18 per cent of the total number of voters left the Third Force. This loss affected almost exclusively the two parties which had been previously allied with the Communists and which had been since 1947 the dominating forces of the majority: the Socialists, who lost 8 per cent of their electors, and the M.R.P. who lost 47 per cent of their electors.

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Where did the 3.5 million votes lost by the Third Force go? They piled up on the Right. Taking together the Gaullists and the group of Moderates and Independents, the Right obtained this time 6,631,000 votes as against only 2,779,000 in 1946. It has therefore made the enormous gain of 3,852,000 votes, a gain greater than the loss of the Third Force. For the Right has drawn upon former Communist votes.

It is officially conceded that there has been a "slight dip" to the Right. Actually, it was a landslide. When a group wins more than 20 per cent of the electorate, this is not exactly a "slight dip".

Note that this landslide has been at the expense of all three of the founding parties of the Fourth Republic. The Communists have lost 450,000, the Socialists 668,000, the M.R.P. 2,685,000. A further point should be made: the Radicals joined the Third Force as minor partners to policies which had not been theirs, principally moved by the desire to get back into the government. But their political affinities really lie with the Independents. And indeed one of their leaders, M. Daladier, who is also the president of the R.G.R., reached an agreement with the Independents before the elections to constitute a "Fourth Force". Combining the R.G.R. and Independent votes as those of the Fourth Force, you get 4,690,000.

* * *

Strength of De Gaulle: To measure the force of the Right, we added up the votes of the Independents (or Moderates) with the Gaullists. We added the Independents to those of the Radicals to measure the Fourth Force. Is it proper to add up all three—Gaullists, Independents and Radicals? Is this total, which comes to 8,824,000 or 46.4 per cent of the voters, meaningful? Does it correspond to any political reality?

I think it does. The people who voted for the Gaullists, or the Independents, or the Radicals, voted for the same policies or at least against the same policies. The difference between them lies essentially in that some trust the General to carry through these policies and some mistrust his authoritarianism. This difference obtains between individuals; it also follows regional lines.

The Gaullists have garnered their one-fifth of the national vote almost exclusively north of the Loire. In the southern part of France, his partisans have made little headway, and the electors have seemed to trust others, such as Radicals, to do the same job of clearing up the intellectual rubble of 1944-46, for which the northerners turn to the General. There is no greater difference between the Radical and the Gaullist voter than there is between a Republican enthusiastic for General MacArthur and one who is not. It follows from the foregoing remarks that a majority of the center (and governments of the center) will constitute a paradox—uniting people who are deeply divided as to policies; while the cleavage between Fourth Force and Gaullists is a matter of opinion about one personality.

The Gaullists are certainly justified in pointing with pride to the fact that they have displaced some 20 per cent of the total vote. Everything that has been lost by the Left or Left Center has been collected by them, with the Radicals and Independents retaining much the same figures as formerly. The non-Gaullists can, on the other hand, complain that the landslide may well be nullified in its parliamentary and governmental consequences because agreement between the conservative factions is hampered by the forceful personality of the General. There the problem stands. A potential majority embracing all elements from the Gaullists to the M.R.P. would seem to represent most faithfully the trend of the electorate. But the General's party is no ordinary party: its destinies are entirely ruled by one man.

* * *

The Elections and Foreign Policy: The correspondents very properly underlined the complete and indeed humiliating defeat of "the neutralist" tickets. This means that no one attaches importance to the views of some intellectuals who feel that France's safety lies in sitting amid the clouds and from that altitude keeping the balance even between the giants of the West and the East. There are those who believe in the good intentions of Russia, the Communist voters, and those who do not: no middle way.

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The number of those who do has decreased. The Communists say that 72 seats have been stolen from them by the new electoral law: they can complain of having no more representatives with 4.5 million votes than the Independents hold with 2.5 million. But they cannot deny that they have lost well-nigh half a million votes—an event unexpected by them and beyond governmental hopes; for officialdom had busied itself in advance with explanations of a rise in the Communist vote!

Therefore conditions are favorable for the Atlantic policy. The main difficulty must lie in the reluctance of the Socialists and of the M.R.P. to take necessary measures, though the latter at least will presumably be chastened by their great loss of votes, and will bow to the wind which blew away so much of their following.

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Paradox of Anti-Anti-Communism: The West finds itself in a puzzling and uneasy position. We oppose Stalinism; therefore, Moscow gleefully taxes us with taking up the cause of the anti-Comintern, that is, of Hitler and Mussolini. This we do, they maintain, after we have fought the enemies of the Comintern to destruction, and in alliance with the Soviets and the Communists all over the world. In the liberated countries of Europe, the Communists were our principal partners in the formation of the initial governments. This procedure was advocated in broadcasts from London, and I understand that allied instructions supported it. The Communists were thereby enabled to preside over the birth of new regimes in Italy and France (not to speak of Yugoslavia), and to exclude anti-Communist elements. Some of these anti-Communists allowed themselves to be drawn into association with the Nazis, thus sealing their fate. Others had to suffer the charge that they were against democracy merely because they were anti-Communists.

The Communists used their preferred position at that time to thoroughly scramble the concepts of democracy and Communism. This confusion was aided by the regrettable articles in the London *Times*, stressing the kinship of the two forms of "democracy". The inference was, of course, that anyone who had been an anti-Communist for a long time must have been in his heart of hearts a Fascist, even though no actual complicity could be established. Even with a good record in the Resistance, he could always be accused of not having cooperated wholeheartedly with the Communists: such foresight must have arisen from sympathy with the enemy. This political classifying that went on in the first months after the Occupation bears heavily on present politics.

Leaders of Western policy are constantly asking themselves: "With whom can we work?" In the struggle against Stalinism, those who have always beeen anti-Communists, or have been so far a long time, would seem to be the most reliable. But, their having been anti-Communists before the war, or their having been not entirely oblivious of the Communist peril during the war, has prevented their securing clearance papers; the Communists presided over the issuance of these papers. It follows that leaning too much on such people would give rise to criticism. It would seem preferable to give more weight to those whose clearance papers are in order.

However, as the Communists have made such bookkeeping their particular business, this means that one must rely on people who have been stamped "good" by the Communists themselves. The chances are strong that some of them are still good for the Communists. It is somewhat ludicrous that "a good record" in Western Europe is a record that has the approval of our present enemy. As I write, there is no evidence that the two missing British diplomats have gone over to Stalin; they may have fallen victims to common bandits. But, I notice that the idea of treason is readily accepted in Britain. These men had very good records in the aforementioned sense.

Such considerations should not trap us into the mistake of regarding a "bad record" in the last war as a promise of good performance in the present struggle. Not only would this be shocking, it would be stupid; a true totalitarian will always find it easier to get on with the Communists than with

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the anti-Communists. On the other hand, we cannot trust associates merely on their anti-Nazi records; nor can we allow Communist-manufactured discriminations to weigh upon our associations.

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A European Viewpoint: A perspicacious American friend, here on tour, observed: "I have no doubt that you people will fight in case of a Russian attack. But what if a general war breaks out in a distant spot? Would even a willing government be able to carry the nation into it? It seems to me that the nations of Europe have been so badly punished, and are now so conscious of smallness and weakness, that they cannot be made to recognize an interest in something not tangible and immediate."

This seems to me to be a true observation. The United States, in its early days, also foresaw war only in the event of a direct attack. Only when one is really strong and in full political health does one recognize the necessity of defending oneself in a distant area. This observer went on to say that the European countries could not cure themselves from the narrow and immediate outlook until they had achieved a true political union. This brings up the question: how is political union faring? And the answer, not too well.

However, I want to mention a promising development. I recently spent a week in the old Flemish city of Bruges, where a College of Europe has been in operation for a year. It was founded by a Dutchman, Prof. Brugmans, under the patronage of the European Movement. This past year it enrolled forty post-graduate students from various European countries, dedicated to the eradication of their nationalistic prejudices. Among other things, they were taught the history of Europe, rather than their respective national histories; their professor, Emmanuel Berl (author of a well-known *History of Europe*) reports that student discussions, in and out of class, evidenced an increasingly broader viewpoint. This is slow going, but it is by such means that we shall progress to our desired end.

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Shorter Notes: Ely Devons, economics dean at Manchester University, has published a most striking book, *Planning in Practice*, which recounts the experience of the British Ministry of Air Production in the last war. It is an indispensible book for those who undertake to plan, and an educative one for those who overlook the difficulties in planning. It is not without comic relief, as when, for instance, it tells about the illusions of major officials about the meaning of graphs. A VIP whose fancy was taken by a rising curve wanted it enlarged; in the enlargement, the curve rose less steeply, which disturbed him, for he could not understand why the curve could not be made to climb just as he pleased by a mere alteration of the scale.

----I hear that the fear of war was a factor in getting out the vast Communist vote in the Italian elections. The Communists promised to "keep Italy out of the war". . . . The French Communists brought up, as a campaign issue, the advocacy by some American military leaders of concentrating on aerial warfare. The Communists point to this as proof that the intention is not to defend Europe; it is to be "bombed after occupation", they say. This argument made a great impression.

----The Iranian affair has many good minds deeply worried. They feel that Moscow aims to deprive the West of its outlying sources of raw materials, and is employing local nationalism for that purpose. Even if Western industry can be raised to insure rearmament as well as an improved standard of living, will not the scarcity of raw materials be an impediment?

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